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ARRESTED DEVELOPMENT: ARIZONA V. GANT AND 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 OF THE WASHINGTON STATE 
CONSTITUTION 
Jacob R. Brown 
Abstract: In Arizona v. Gant,1 the United States Supreme Court held that the search of a 
vehicle incident to arrest is permissible in only two situations: (1) when the arrestee is 
unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment; or (2) when it is 
reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be found in the 
vehicle. Because Gant expressed a standard more protective than that established by the 
Washington State Supreme Court, Gant induced a state of confusion in Washington, where it 
has long been maintained that article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution offers 
broader protections than those available under the Fourth Amendment. Since Gant, the Court 
has twice attempted to redefine the search of a vehicle incident to arrest under article I, 
section 7. In State v. Patton,2 and subsequently in State v. Valdez,3 the Washington State 
Supreme Court adopted a standard closely resembling the first Gant prong. However, neither 
decision expressly adopted or rejected the second. Because the second prong is supported by 
historical Washington case law, the Washington State Supreme Court should adopt a 
modified version of the Gant rule, with an added proscription on the opening of any locked 
containers located during the search. Such a modification would satisfy the heightened 
privacy protections of article I, section 7. 
INTRODUCTION 
For more than eighty years, Washington courts have struggled to 
define the constitutionally authorized preconditions of the search of a 
vehicle incident to arrest. Following a peripatetic path between the 
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, 
section 7 of the Washington State Constitution, Washington 
jurisprudence regarding the search of a vehicle incident to arrest reveals 
little in the way of constancy or predictability.4 Never has this been more 
                                                     
1. 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1710 (2009). 
2. 167 Wash. 2d 379, 219 P.3d 651 (2009). 
3. 167 Wash. 2d 761, 224 P.3d 751 (2009). 
4. See State v. Hughlett, 124 Wash. 366, 214 P. 841 (1923) (holding an officer may search a 
vehicle incident to arrest for evidence that tends to prove the crime of arrest if the vehicle is under 
the control of the arrestee); State v. Deitz, 136 Wash. 228, 239 P. 386 (1925) (holding search of a 
vehicle incident to arrest need not be for evidence relevant to the crime of arrest); State v. Miller, 
151 Wash. 114, 275 P. 75 (1929) (predicating the valid search of a vehicle incident to arrest solely 
upon the occurrence of a lawful arrest); State v. Cyr, 40 Wash. 2d 840, 246 P.2d 480 (1952) 
(allowing the search of a vehicle incident to arrest when it was parked reasonably close to the scene 
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apparent than in the wake of the United States Supreme Court’s 
imposition of new guidelines for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest 
as announced in Arizona v. Gant.5 Because Washington courts have long 
provided that article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution 
offers broader protections than those available under the Fourth 
Amendment,6 Gant has left judges and lawyers in Washington 
scrambling to redetermine this already contentious issue.7 A recent oral 
argument before the Washington Court of Appeals is particularly 
illustrative—hardly had the deputy prosecutor taken the podium before a 
perhaps playfully exasperated judge implored, “I hope you can clear this 
up!”8 
                                                     
of the arrest, and the officers were looking for evidence relevant to crime of the arrest); State v. 
Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962) (permitting the search of a vehicle incident to 
arrest for evidence of the crime or tools which would aid in the arrested person’s escape, so long as 
the vehicle is within the arrestee’s immediate environs). In State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 
P.2d 1240 (1983), the Washington State Supreme Court overruled this line of cases and held that a 
search of a vehicle incident to arrest could only be justified by the presence of certain exigencies, 
determined by a totality of the circumstances test. This test was subsequently overturned by State v. 
Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986), which adopted a bright-line rule for the search of a 
vehicle incident to arrest with the added requirement under article I, section 7 that an officer not 
open locked containers. However, Stroud was then overturned by State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d. 
761, 777, 224 P.3d 751, 759 (2009), which held that “after an arrestee is secured and removed from 
the automobile . . . the arrestee’s presence does not justify a warrantless search under the search 
incident to arrest exception [and] Stroud’s expansive interpretation to the contrary . . . is overruled.” 
5. 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009). 
6. See, e.g., State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 148, 720 P.2d 436, 439 (1986) (“[Article I, 
section 7 of the] Washington State Constitution affords individuals greater protections against 
warrantless searches than does the Fourth Amendment.”). 
7. See Audio Recording of Oral Argument, State v. Wright, __ P.3d __, (Wash. Ct. App. 2010) 
(No. 62142-4-I), http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/OralArgAudio/a01/20091104/2.%20State%20v. 
%20Wright%20%20%2062142-4.wma [hereinafter Wright Oral Argument] (debating the post-Gant 
preconditions for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest under article I, section 7); Respondent’s 
Response to Motion for Reconsideration at 5, Wright, __ P.3d __, (No. 62142-4-I ) (arguing that the 
second Gant exception, allowing an officer to search the passenger compartment incident to arrest 
when it is reasonable to believe that it contains evidence of the crime of arrest, applies in 
Washington); Appellant’s Motion for Reconsideration at 4–6, Wright, __ P.3d __, (No. 62142-4-I) 
(arguing that Gant precludes any search of a vehicle incident to arrest when the arrestee has been 
secured away from the scene of the search); see also Brief of Respondent at 68, State v. Jordan, No. 
62076-2-I (Wash. Ct. App. filed Aug. 21, 2009) (arguing that the Gant rule allowing officers to 
search a car when it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be 
found inside the vehicle is permitted by article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution); 
Brief of Appellant at 36, Jordan, No. 62076-2-I (Wash. Ct. App. filed June 9, 2009) (arguing that 
the second Gant rule does not exist under article I, section 7). 
8. Wright Oral Argument, supra note 7. Additionally, at an oral argument in February of 2010, 
Division I of the Washington Court of Appeals allowed counsel for the appellant and respondent to 
speak for nearly a combined hour and a half on the question of Gant’s impact on the search of a 
vehicle incident to arrest under article I, section 7. Audio Recording of Oral Argument, State v. 
Mills, No. 62732-5 (Wash. Ct. App. argued Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.courts.wa.gov/content/ 
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The lack of clarity lamented by the court of appeals results from the 
interaction between article I, section 7, and the new standard contained 
in Gant. At the time of Gant’s announcement, the prevailing 
understanding among federal courts was that New York v. Belton9 
provided a bright-line standard, authorizing an officer to search the 
passenger compartment of a vehicle incident to a recent occupant’s 
arrest irrespective of any concerns for the officer’s safety or the 
preservation of evidence.10 Washington State courts adhered to a similar 
bright-line standard under State v. Stroud,11 with the added protection, as 
required by article I, section 7, that an officer could not open any locked 
containers during the search.12 
The Gant Court rejected a broad, bright-line reading of Belton, and 
reduced the applicability of the search incident to arrest exception to two 
situations. First, reasserting concerns expressed earlier in Chimel v. 
California,13 the Court held that an officer may search a vehicle incident 
to arrest when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of 
the passenger compartment.14 Second, deriving from Justice Scalia’s 
concurring opinion in Thornton v. United States,15 an officer may search 
a vehicle incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence 
relevant to the crime of arrest may be found in the passenger 
compartment.16 The Gant Court therefore established a rule under the 
Fourth Amendment that was more protective than the bright-line 
standard previously held permissible under Stroud and article I, section 7 
of the Washington State Constitution. Given Washington’s long-held 
judicial maxim that article I, section 7 provides greater protections than 
the Fourth Amendment, Gant thrust Washington law into uncertain 
                                                     
OralArgAudio/a01/20100223/5.%20State%20v.%20Mills%20%20%2062732-5.wma. 
9. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
10. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1718. 
11. 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 P.2d 436 (1986), overruled by State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 
777, 224 P.3d 751, 759 (2009). 
12. Id. at 152, 720 P.2d at 441; see also State v. Vrieling, 144 Wash. 2d 489, 492–93, 28 P.3d 
762, 765 (2001) (citing Stroud for the proposition that officers may search a vehicle incident to 
arrest irrespective of concerns for officer safety or the preservation of evidence); State v. Patterson, 
112 Wash. 2d 731, 735, 774 P.2d 10, 12 (1989) (citing Stroud and noting that “concerns for the 
safety of officers and potential destructibility of evidence do outweigh privacy interests and warrant 
a bright-line rule permitting limited searches”). 
13. 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969) (limiting a search incident to arrest to the “person and the area from 
within which [an arrestee could obtain] either a weapon or something that could have been used as 
evidence against [the arrestee]”). 
14. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. 
15. 541 U.S. 615, 625 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
16. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. 
Brown DTPed.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2010 10:24 AM 
358 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:355 
 
territory. Since Gant, the Washington State Supreme Court has twice 
attempted to reconcile the search of a vehicle incident to arrest under 
article I, section 7, with the Fourth Amendment: first in State v. Patton,17 
and later in State v. Valdez.18 
Part I of this Comment reviews the development of federal law on the 
search of a vehicle incident to arrest, specifically with respect to the 
Chimel-Belton rule and “relevant evidence rule”19 contained in Gant. 
Part II reviews the history of Washington jurisprudence on the search of 
a vehicle incident to arrest and the relationship between article I, section 
7 and the Fourth Amendment. Part III examines the Washington State 
Supreme Court’s efforts in Patton and Valdez to craft a post-Gant 
standard in line with both article I, section 7 of the Washington State 
Constitution and the Fourth Amendment. Finally, Part IV of this 
Comment argues that, should the Washington State Supreme Court be 
faced with a case that squarely implicates Gant’s relevant evidence rule, 
it should adopt a modified version of the rule that contains an added 
proscription on the opening of locked containers. 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT PERMITS THE SEARCH OF A 
VEHICLE INCIDENT TO ARREST UNDER TWO 
CONDITIONS 
The standard for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest under the 
Fourth Amendment has fluctuated throughout its modern history.20 
Cases in the second half of the twentieth century led to the development 
                                                     
17. 167 Wash. 2d 379, 219 P.3d 651 (2009). 
18. 167 Wash. 2d 761, 224 P.3d 751 (2009). 
19. This Comment uses the term “relevant evidence rule” to refer to the rule articulated by Justice 
Scalia in his concurring opinion in Thornton, and adopted by the United States Supreme Court in 
Gant. The rule provides that an officer may search a vehicle incident to arrest when it is reasonable 
to believe that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be found in the vehicle. Gant, 129 S. Ct. 
at 1719 (citing Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
20. See, e.g., Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Breaking Point: Embracing Justice Scalia’s Call 
for the Supreme Court to Abandon an Unreasonable Approach to Fourth Amendment Search and 
Seizure Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 77, 80 (2007) (noting the “checkered history” of the search of a 
vehicle incident to arrest exception under the Fourth Amendment); Jason Hermele, Comment, 
Arizona v. Gant: Rethinking the Evidence-Gathering Justification for the Search Incident to Arrest 
Exception, and Testing a New Approach, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 175, 175 (2009) (noting the 
“inconsistent history” of the search of a vehicle incident to arrest exception under the Fourth 
Amendment); Kirsten M. Sjue, Comment, Constitutional Law—Search and Seizure: The North 
Dakota Supreme Court Considers Whether an Officer May Search a Non-Arrested Person’s Purse 
Incident to the Arrest of Another Person in the Same Vehicle, 81 N.D. L. REV. 377, 393 (2005) 
(noting that the United States Supreme Court’s search incident to arrest jurisprudence prior to 1969 
was “inconsistent and unpredictable”). 
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of two main doctrines that provide alternative bases for the search of a 
vehicle incident to arrest. The first of these is the Chimel-Belton rule, 
which authorizes the search of a vehicle incident to arrest in order to 
protect officer safety or preserve evidence.21 The second is the relevant 
evidence rule, which permits an officer to search the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle when it is reasonable to believe that it contains 
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest.22 The present incarnation of 
both doctrines appears in Gant, which clarified the Chimel-Belton rule 
and formally adopted the relevant evidence rule.23 
A. The Chimel-Belton Rule Authorizes the Search of a Vehicle 
Incident to Arrest in Order to Protect Officer Safety or Preserve 
Evidence 
The Chimel-Belton rule24 derives from two flagship federal cases 
decided in 196925 and 198126 respectively, although its modern roots are 
detectable as early as 1964.27 Interpretations of the Chimel-Belton rule, 
which predicates the search of a vehicle incident to arrest upon certain 
prerequisite concerns, varied from narrow to expansive over the years 
until finally clarified in Gant.28 
The Chimel-Belton rule authorizes the search of a vehicle incident to 
arrest in order to protect officer safety or to preserve evidence.29 The rule 
arises from the Fourth Amendment, which states: 
                                                     
21. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (construing Belton and Chimel to authorize the search of a 
vehicle incident to arrest “only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment at the time of the search”). 
22. See id. 
23. Id. 
24. For examples of the usage of this term, see United States v. Vasey, 834 F.2d 782, 787 (9th 
Cir. 1987), referring to a “Chimel/Belton doctrine” and United States v. Monclavo-Cruz, 662 F.2d 
1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1981), referring to a “Chimel/Belton” search. 
25. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969). 
26. New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
27. See Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964). 
28. See infra Part I.C (discussing Gant’s clarification of the Chimel-Belton rule). 
29. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (construing Belton and 
Chimel to authorize the search of a vehicle incident to arrest “only when the arrestee is unsecured 
and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the search”); see also 
Belton, 453 U.S. at 460 (construing Chimel to authorize the rule that, when an officer has lawfully 
arrested an occupant of a vehicle, he may search the passenger compartment of that vehicle incident 
to arrest); Chimel, 395 U.S. at 762–68  (noting an officer may search an arrestee incident to arrest in 
order to protect officer safety or preserve evidence, but such a search must be limited to the 
arrestee’s person or the area from within which he or she might obtain a weapon or something that 
could be used as evidence against him or her); Preston, 376 U.S. at 367 (1964) (noting a search 
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The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.30 
As far back as 1925, the Supreme Court held that the warrantless 
search of a vehicle may meet the criterion of reasonableness under the 
Fourth Amendment.31 Although a warrantless search is generally 
unreasonable,32 the Court developed an exception to the warrant 
requirement for valid searches incident to arrest.33 
The beginnings of the modern development of the Chimel-Belton rule 
are illustrated by the 1964 case Preston v. United States.34 In Preston, 
the United States Supreme Court required proximity in “time or place” 
for a valid search of a vehicle incident to arrest.35 The case arose when 
officers arrested and removed the passengers of a car, drove it to police 
headquarters, and then searched the car and found drug paraphernalia.36 
The Court ruled that the search did not constitute a valid search incident 
to arrest because such searches are justified by the need to protect officer 
safety and preserve destructible or concealable evidence, and must 
therefore be proximate to the arrest in both time and place.37 
In 1969, Chimel further limited the search incident to arrest exception 
to the area within the arrestee’s immediate control.38 Chimel stemmed 
from a situation in which officers confronted a suspect and executed an 
arrest warrant against him in his home.39 The officers searched the entire 
house incident to arrest and seized numerous items, which were admitted 
against the defendant at trial.40 The California Supreme Court upheld the 
defendant’s resulting conviction and the admission of evidence because 
                                                     
incident to arrest is justified by the need to protect officer safety or preserve evidence of the crime 
of arrest and extends to the arrestee’s person and area within his immediate control). 
30. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
31. Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925). 
32. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). 
33. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914). 
34. 376 U.S. 364 (1964). 
35. Id. at 367. 
36. Id. at 365–66. 
37. Id. at 367–68. 
38. 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). 
39. Id. at 753. 
40. Id. at 753–54. 
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“the search of the petitioner’s home had been justified . . . [as] incident 
to a valid arrest,”41 but the United States Supreme Court reversed.42 
Drawing on its reasoning in Preston,43 the Court reasoned that, although 
the arrest itself was valid, 
[t]he search . . . went far beyond the petitioner’s person and the 
area from within which he might have obtained either a weapon 
or something that could have been used as evidence against him. 
There was no constitutional justification, in the absence of a 
search warrant, for extending the search beyond that area.44 
The Court reaffirmed the Fourth Amendment principle that a search 
incident to arrest must remain limited to the area within the arrestee’s 
“immediate control,” defined as “the area from within which he might 
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence.”45 
In 1981, Belton extended the Chimel “immediate control” test to the 
search of an automobile incident to arrest.46 In that case, an officer 
removed multiple suspects from a vehicle, arrested them for possession 
of marijuana, and secured them in separate locations.47 The officer then 
searched each suspect individually, as well as the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle, where he found a jacket containing 
cocaine.48 
The United States Supreme Court ruled the search constitutional.49 
The Court referred to its reasoning in Chimel, noting that “a lawful 
custodial arrest creates a situation which justifies the contemporaneous 
search without a warrant of the person arrested and of the immediately 
surrounding area.”50 The Court stated further that “[s]uch searches have 
long been considered valid because of the need ‘to remove any weapons 
that [the arrestee] might seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his 
escape’ and the need to prevent the concealment or destruction of 
evidence.”51 
                                                     
41. Id. at 754–55. 
42. Id. at 768. 
43. Id. at 763–64 (citing Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367 (1964)). 
44. Id. at 768. 
45. Id. at 763. 
46. 453 U.S. 454, 460 (1981). 
47. Id. at 455–56. 
48. Id. at 456. 
49. Id. at 462–63. 
50. Id. at 457 (citing Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763). 
51. Id. (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763). 
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However, the Court was unable to find within existing case law 
“[any] workable definition of ‘the area within the immediate control of 
the arrestee’ when that area arguably includes the interior of an 
automobile and the arrestee is its recent occupant.”52 Instead, the Court 
found that case law “suggest[ed] the generalization that articles inside 
the relatively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an 
automobile are in fact generally, even if not inevitably, within ‘the area 
into which an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or 
evidentiary ite[m].’”53 Accordingly, the Court held that “when a 
policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an 
automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search 
the passenger compartment of that automobile,” including “the contents 
of any containers found within the passenger compartment.”54 
Importantly, the Court further noted that its holding “in no way alter[ed] 
the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case regarding the 
basic scope of searches incident to lawful custodial arrests.”55 
Finally, in applying its reasoning to the arrestee’s case, the Court held 
that, because “the jacket was located inside the passenger compartment 
of the car,” it was “‘within the arrestee’s immediate control.’”56 The 
search of the jacket, the Court found, was therefore a search incident to a 
lawful custodial arrest.57 
Notably, Belton allowed the search incident to arrest of the passenger 
compartment of a vehicle, even after the arrestees had been secured and 
removed from the vehicle.58 This generated confusion among the lower 
courts,59 and fostered expansive interpretations of the Chimel-Belton 
rule—i.e. that Belton loosened the preconditions for the search of a 
vehicle incident to arrest to the point where an officer could permissibly 
search the passenger compartment of a vehicle, completely irrespective 
                                                     
52. Id. at 460 (citations omitted). 
53. Id. (quoting Chimel, 395 U.S. at 763). 
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 460 n.3. 
56. Id. at 462 (quoting Chimel, 495 at 763). 
57. Id. at 462–63. 
58. Id. at 456. 
59. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1718 & n.2 (2009) (reviewing lower court 
treatment of the Belton rule). 
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of the location of the arrestee.60 Not until Gant did the Court address and 
sharply correct this apparent drift.61 
B. The Relevant Evidence Rule Permits an Officer to Search the 
Passenger Compartment of a Vehicle When It Is Reasonable to 
Believe It Contains Evidence Relevant to the Crime of Arrest 
The relevant evidence rule provides an alternative basis for the search 
of a vehicle incident to arrest under the Fourth Amendment, one that 
does not depend upon the justifications of protecting officer safety or 
preserving evidence.62 Justice Scalia first articulated this rule in his 
concurring opinion in Thornton v. United States,63 in which he argued 
that searches of a vehicle incident to arrest are instead justified by the 
reasonable belief that evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be 
found in the passenger compartment of the vehicle.64 This Section 
reviews Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Thornton. 
Thornton addressed the question of whether Belton allowed officers 
to search a vehicle incident to arrest even when the arrestee was not first 
contacted until after leaving the vehicle.65 The majority held that Belton 
did permit such a search, providing that “[s]o long as an arrestee is [a] 
                                                     
60. Id. at 1718 (“[Belton] has been widely understood to allow a vehicle search incident to the 
arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibility the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle 
at the time of the search.”) 
61. See infra Part I.C. It should also be noted that the Gant Court split on the issue of whether the 
first prong contained in that opinion represented the re-narrowing of an exception that had been 
misinterpreted by lower courts or the promulgation of a new standard altogether. The lead opinion, 
written by Justice Stevens, and joined by justices Scalia, Souter, Thomas, and Ginsburg, treated the 
first prong as a clarification of Chimel-Belton searches—i.e., a course correction for an exception 
that had steadily expanded beyond its roots. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (“[W]e reject this [broad] 
reading of Belton and hold that the Chimel rationale authorizes police to search a vehicle incident to 
a recent occupant’s arrest only when the arrestee is unsecured and within reaching distance of the 
passenger compartment at the time of the search.”). Although he joined the majority, Justice Scalia 
also wrote separately and cautioned that the lead opinion had mischaracterized the reality of the 
development of the search incident to arrest exception under the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1724 
(Scalia, J., concurring). Instead, Justice Scalia argued that Belton and Thornton really had stated 
broad rules, allowing precisely the type of non-present arrestee searches that Gant was now 
characterizing as historically impermissible. Id. (“[T]he rule set forth in [Belton] and [Thornton]” is 
actually that “arresting officers may always search an arrestee’s vehicle in order to protect 
themselves from hidden weapons.” (citations omitted)). 
62. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (adopting the relevant evidence rule from Justice Scalia’s concurring 
opinion in Thornton, and noting that it does not follow from Chimel); Thornton v. United States, 
541 U.S. 615, 629 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that evidence relevant to the crime of 
arrest provides an alternative basis for a search incident to arrest). 
63. 541 U.S. 615 (2004). 
64. Id. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring). 
65. Id. at 617 (majority opinion). 
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‘recent occupant’ of a vehicle . . . officers may search that vehicle 
incident to the arrest.”66 In reaching this conclusion, the majority cited 
two primary justifications: first, that recent occupants presented 
“identical concerns” to officer safety and the destruction of evidence;67 
and second, that law enforcement needs justified a bright line rule, such 
as that provided by Belton.68 
Justice Scalia found the Court’s application of the Chimel-Belton rule 
misguided.69 First, Justice Scalia noted that at the time of the officer’s 
search of the vehicle, the suspect was secured in the officer’s patrol 
car.70 The suspect was therefore “neither in, nor anywhere near, the 
passenger compartment of the vehicle,” and “[t]he risk that he would 
nevertheless ‘grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m]’ from his car was 
remote in the extreme.”71 
Justice Scalia then enumerated three possible justifications for 
applying the Chimel-Belton rule to the instant case, in spite of its 
apparent inappositeness, and rejected each in turn.72 He concluded that, 
“[i]f Belton searches are justifiable, it is not because the arrestee might 
grab a weapon or evidentiary item from his car, but simply because the 
car might contain evidence relevant to the crime for which he was 
arrested.”73 Justice Scalia explained: 
This more general sort of evidence-gathering search is not 
without antecedent. For example, in United States v. Rabinowitz, 
                                                     
66. Id. at 623–24 (emphasis added). 
67. Id. at 621. 
68. Id. at 622–23 (“The need for a clear rule, readily understood by police officers and not 
depending on differing estimates of what items were or were not within reach of an arrestee at any 
particular moment, justifies the sort of generalization which Belton enunciated.”). 
69. Id. at 625 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“The Court’s effort to apply [the Chimel-Belton rule] to this 
search stretches it beyond its breaking point . . . .”). 
70. Id. 
71. Id. (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). 
72. The first possible justification was that the suspect could escape his handcuffs, and grab 
something from the car. Id. at 625–26 (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia rejected this 
justification on the grounds that the government had not demonstrated that this was an appreciable 
risk. Id. at 626–27. The second was that limiting the search of a vehicle incident to arrest to settings 
in which a suspect is still in the car at the time of arrest would force police to leave suspects in a 
dangerous position in order to search the vehicle. Id. at 627. Justice Scalia dismissed this 
explanation because it is not the right of the police to search a vehicle without a warrant. Id. The 
third justification was that Belton searches are generally reasonable and that the benefits of a bright-
line rule justify upholding the minority of searches that are not (especially because the practice of 
securing suspects is so prevalent that finding a search in such situations unreasonable would largely 
render Belton moot). Id. at 627–28. Justice Scalia rejected this final justification on principle, stating 
that the need for clarity cannot be held to outweigh constitutional requirements. Id. at 628–29. 
73. Id. at 629. 
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we upheld a search of the suspect’s place of business after he 
was arrested there. We did not restrict the officers’ search 
authority to “the area into which [the] arrestee might reach in 
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary ite[m],” and we did not 
justify the search as a means to prevent concealment or 
destruction of evidence. Rather, we relied on a more general 
interest in gathering evidence relevant to the crime for which the 
suspect had been arrested.74 
Justice Scalia then cited multiple federal cases, English cases, and 
treatises, dating back to the mid-nineteenth century.75 According to 
Justice Scalia, these authorities established an approach “referring to the 
general interest in gathering evidence related to the crime of arrest with 
no mention of the more specific interest in preventing its concealment or 
destruction.”76 “Only in the years leading up to Chimel,” he asserted, 
“did we start consistently referring to the narrower interest in frustrating 
concealment or destruction of evidence.”77 Ultimately, Justice Scalia 
conceded that both the narrow approach contained in Chimel, and the 
broader approach contained in Rabinowitz, were “plausible accounts of 
what the Constitution requires.”78 He nevertheless concluded that 
“Belton [could not] reasonably be explained as a mere application of 
Chimel.”79 Instead, Belton marked “a return to the broader sort of search 
incident to arrest that [was] allowed before Chimel—limited . . . to 
searches of motor vehicles, a category of ‘effects’ which give rise to a 
reduced expectation of privacy, and heightened law enforcement 
needs.”80 In this context, according to Justice Scalia, the only thing that 
                                                     
74. Thornton, 541 U.S. at 629 (citations omitted). Justice Scalia relied here upon United States v. 
Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56 (1950), despite the fact that its search incident to arrest doctrine was 
disapproved by the United States Supreme Court in Chimel, 395 U.S. 752, 760 (1961) (“[The 
Rabinowitz] doctrine . . . can withstand neither historical nor rational analysis.”). Id. However, 
Justice Scalia’s point in his Thornton concurrence was simply that because the facts of the case did 
not present the concerns that justified a Chimel-Belton search—i.e., officer safety or preservation of 
evidence—something else must have justified the search: the relevancy of the evidence sought. “[I]f 
we are going to continue to allow Belton searches on stare decisis grounds,” wrote Justice Scalia, 
“we should at least be honest about why we are doing so.” Thornton, 541 U.S. at 631 (Scalia, J., 
concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Scalia further sought to rehabilitate the Rabinowitz doctrine 
on the grounds that it was “‘not general or exploratory for whatever might be turned up’ but 
reflected a reasonable belief that evidence would be found.” Id. at 632 (quoting Rabinowitz, 339 
U.S. at 62–63). 
75. Id. at 629–30. 
76. Id. at 629. 
77. Id. at 630 (citing, inter alia, Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964)). 
78. Id. at 631. 
79. Id. 
80. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
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could rationally justify the search of a vehicle incident to arrest was the 
relevancy of the evidence sought to the crime of arrest.81 Thus, the 
relevant evidence rule was born, but was not adopted as a majority rule 
until 2009 in Gant.82 
C. In Gant, the United States Supreme Court Clarified the Chimel-
Belton Rule and Adopted the Relevant Evidence Rule 
With its 2009 ruling in Gant, the Supreme Court corrected the steady 
expansion of the Chimel-Belton rule beyond its original justifications 
and adopted Justice Scalia’s relevant evidence rule.83 In so doing, the 
Court announced two rules that provide the sole permissible 
preconditions for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest under the 
Fourth Amendment.84 The first rule, arising from Chimel and Belton, 
allows an officer to search a vehicle incident to arrest when the arrestee 
is unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger 
compartment.85 The second, drawing upon Justice Scalia’s concurring 
opinion in Thornton, provides that an officer may search a vehicle 
incident to arrest when it is reasonable to believe that evidence relevant 
to the crime of arrest may be found in the vehicle.86 
1. Gant Clarifies the Chimel-Belton Rule 
The expansive interpretation of the Chimel-Belton rule that 
proliferated in the wake of Belton was sharply set aside by Gant. Like 
Belton, Gant involved the search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of a 
suspect arrested for driving with a suspended license and securely 
                                                     
81. Id. 
82. In the meantime, lower courts took notice of Justice Scalia’s reasoning. The Sixth Circuit, for 
example, discussed Justice Scalia’s adoption of a relevant evidence standard in an unpublished 
opinion, but noted that the question was “not open for lower courts . . . to consider.” United States v. 
Jones, 155 F. App’x 204, 208 (6th Cir. 2005). In another unpublished opinion in the First Circuit, a 
district court noted the rule, but cautioned that “[t]he standards for Justice Scalia’s proposed rule [in 
Thornton] have not been fully developed.” United States v. Walston, No. CR. 04-78-B-W, 2005 WL 
757592, at *3 n.3 (D. Me. Mar. 14, 2005). Similarly, Judge Gibson of the Eighth Circuit, citing 
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Thornton, noted that “some have expressed concern with the 
soundness of the entire Belton framework.” United States v. Hrasky, 453 F.3d 1099, 1107 n.5 (8th 
Cir. 1006) (Gibson, J., dissenting). 
83. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (rejecting a broad reading of 
Belton and adopting the relevant evidence standard for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest from 
Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton, even though it does not follow from Chimel). 
84. Id. 
85. Id.; see also supra note 21. 
86. Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719. 
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handcuffed in the back of a patrol car at the time of the search.87 The 
officers searched Gant’s car, finding a gun and a bag of cocaine in the 
pocket of a jacket in the backseat.88 
At Gant’s trial for narcotics charges stemming from evidence located 
in his vehicle, the Arizona trial court ruled that the search of Gant’s car 
was valid incident to arrest, and he was convicted.89 The Arizona 
Supreme Court reversed, ruling that the bright-line rule contained in 
Belton referred only to the scope of the search of a vehicle incident to 
arrest and did not authorize such a search unless the exigencies 
contained in Chimel existed as preconditions to the search.90 
The United States Supreme Court agreed with the Arizona Supreme 
Court’s narrow reading of Belton.91 The Court concluded: 
To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every 
recent occupant’s arrest would thus untether the rule from the 
justifications underlying the Chimel exception—a result clearly 
incompatible with our statement in Belton that it “in no way 
alters the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case 
regarding the basic scope of searches incident to lawful 
custodial arrests.”92 
Because officers searched Gant’s vehicle after he had been removed 
and secured, Chimel’s twin concerns of officer safety and preservation 
of evidence were not implicated, and the search of Gant’s car was 
therefore unreasonable.93 
                                                     
87. Id. at 1715. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 1715–16. 
91. Id. at 1719. 
92. Id. at 1719 (quoting New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.3 (1981)). Though the Court in 
Belton, quoted here in Gant, used the word “scope,” this Comment assumes that the Belton Court 
meant to express that its ruling did not alter the preconditions necessary for the search of a vehicle 
incident to arrest (i.e., that even under Belton, an arrestee would still have to present concerns for 
officer safety or the preservation of evidence, hence the Gant Court’s requirement that an arrestee 
be unsecured and within reaching distance of the passenger compartment). The Court’s use of the 
word “scope” in Belton—and as understood by the Gant Court—was informal and colloquial, and, 
given the likely confusion presented here with the legal term of art as it applies to searches, an 
unfortunate coincidence. 
93. Id. at 1719. 
Brown DTPed.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2010 10:24 AM 
368 WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 85:355 
 
2.  Gant Adopted the Relevant Evidence Rule 
After clarifying the Chimel-Belton rule, the Supreme Court proceeded 
to adopt the relevant evidence rule.94 Citing Justice Scalia’s concurring 
opinion in Thornton, but without any further analysis, the Gant Court 
provided that “[a]lthough it does not follow from Chimel, we also 
conclude that circumstances unique to the vehicle context justify a 
search incident to a lawful arrest when it is ‘reasonable to believe 
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest might be found in the vehicle.’”95 
Even under this standard, the search of Gant’s car was unreasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment, because “[w]hereas Belton and Thornton 
were arrested for drug offenses, Gant was arrested for driving with a 
suspended license—an offense for which police could not expect to find 
evidence in the passenger compartment of Gant’s car.”96 In other words, 
the search of Gant’s car was unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment 
for two reasons: first, at the time of the search, Gant was safely secured 
in the back of a patrol car and thus posed no threat to officer safety or 
evidentiary preservation; and second, police could not have reasonably 
expected to find any evidence in Gant’s vehicle relevant to the crime of 
driving without a license. Thus, the Court created a new two-prong 
approach to determining reasonableness of searches incident to arrest 
under the Fourth Amendment. 
II. THE SEARCH OF A VEHICLE INCIDENT TO ARREST 
EXCEPTION IN WASHINGTON STEMS FROM BOTH 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 7 AND FOURTH AMENDMENT LAW 
The case law regarding the search of a vehicle incident to arrest in 
Washington dates back to the 1920s,97 but its underlying rationale is 
rooted in the adoption of article I, section 7 of the Washington State 
Constitution in 1889,98 and English common law.99 The present 
                                                     
94. Id. (quoting Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 632 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
95. Id. (quoting Thornton, 541 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
96. Id. 
97. See, e.g., State v. Hughlett, 124 Wash. 366, 370, 214 P. 841, 843 (1923) (allowing a 
warrantless search incident to arrest of a vehicle and suitcases therein). 
98. THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1889, at 497 
(Beverly P. Rosenow ed., 1962) [hereinafter JOURNAL]. 
99. See, e.g., State ex rel. Murphy v. Brown, 83 Wash. 100, 106, 145 P. 69, 71 (1914). The 
Washington State Supreme Court cited Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914), for the 
proposition that “the right to search the person of one under legal arrest . . . has always been 
recognized under English and American law, and has been uniformly maintained in many cases.” 
Brown, 83 Wash. at 106, 145 P. at 71 (citing Weeks, 232 U.S. at 392). 
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controversy over the search incident to arrest is best understood as the 
function of a complicated interplay between federal and Washington 
law, as old as the exception itself. Early on, Washington courts 
concentrated their analysis of the exception to the warrant requirement 
under a combination of article I, section 7 and common law 
jurisprudence.100 As the century progressed, the courts turned 
increasingly to the Fourth Amendment, before refocusing on article I, 
section 7 in the 1980s.101 Now, after Gant, Washington courts are again 
faced with the challenge of recalibrating Washington law in light of the 
Fourth Amendment. 
Despite its length and complexity, the pre-Gant law of vehicle 
searches incident to arrest in Washington may be broadly divided into 
five developmental stages. The Washington State Supreme Court has 
recognized three initial stages during which Washington courts turned 
increasingly from article I, section 7 and common law toward federal 
law.102 In a self-declared return to Washington law, the case of State v. 
Ringer103 marks a brief fourth stage, which allowed the search of a 
vehicle incident to arrest only under certain exigent circumstances.104 A 
fifth stage began with State v. Stroud, which promulgated a bright-line 
standard for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest.105 This standard 
survived until 2009, when Gant generated the present uncertainty. 
 
                                                     
100. See State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 690–94, 674 P.2d 1240, 1243–1244 (1983) (noting 
that Washington courts defined the search of a vehicle incident to arrest exception in the early days 
of its fashioning in light of article I, section 7 and common law). 
101. See id. at 699, 674 P.2d at 1247 (“We choose now to return to the protections of our own 
constitution and to interpret them consistent with their common law beginnings.”); see also State v. 
Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 146, 720 P.2d 436, 438 (1986) (noting the Court’s intention “to define 
more precisely the scope of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement implied in article 
1, section 7 of the Washington Constitution”). 
102. See Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 698, 720 P.2d at 1247 (“We perceive three stages in the prior 
development of the search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement.”). 
103. Id. at 699, 674 P.2d at 1247 (1983) (announcing a return to article I, section 7 of the 
Washington State Constitution in order to define the search of a vehicle incident to arrest). 
104. Id. at 698–702, 674 P.2d at 1247–49; see also State v. Parker, 139 Wash. 2d 486, 514, 987 
P.2d 73 (1999) (“[I]n Ringer, we . . . . adopted a case-by-case ‘totality of the circumstances’ test to 
determine whether the exigencies in fact supported a warrantless search [incident to arrest] in any 
given case.” (emphasis added) (citations omitted)). 
105. 106 Wash. 2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (1986) (“During the arrest process, including the 
time immediately subsequent to the suspect’s being arrested, handcuffed, and placed in a patrol car, 
officers should be allowed to search the passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons or 
destructible evidence. However, if the officers encounter a locked container or locked glove 
compartment, they may not unlock and search either container without obtaining a warrant.”). 
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A. Washington’s Early Understanding of a Search Incident to Arrest 
Was Rooted in Article I, Section 7, as Informed by Common Law 
Early incarnations of the search incident to arrest exception in 
Washington allowed an officer to search the person of an arrestee for 
evidence “which the officer reasonably believes to be connected with the 
supposed crime.”106 This understanding derived from article I, section 7 
and the common law.107 Therefore, a proper historical analysis of the 
search incident to arrest exception in Washington begins with these 
sources. 
The Washington State Constitutional Convention adopted article I, 
section 7 in 1889,108 as follows: 
No person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home 
invaded, without authority of law.109 
Significantly, records show that the constitutional convention 
considered text identical to the Fourth Amendment, but rejected it in 
favor of the wording adopted for article I, section 7.110 Courts and 
scholars have interpreted this choice to demonstrate the framers’ intent 
that article I, section 7 offers citizens greater protections than those 
available under the Fourth Amendment.111 
                                                     
106. State ex rel. Murphy v. Brown, 83 Wash. 100, 105, 145 P. 69, 71 (1914). 
107. See State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 773, 224 P.3d 751, 757 (2009) (In order to define the 
search incident to arrest exception, “[the Washington State Supreme Court] look[s] at the 
constitutional text, the origins and law at the time [the Washington] constitution was adopted, and 
the evolution of that law and its doctrinal development.”); Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d at 149, 720 P.2d at 
439 (determining the search of a vehicle incident to arrest exception in Washington solely on 
independent state grounds, i.e., in light of article I, section 7); id. at 153–54, 720 P.2d at 441–42 
(Durham, J., concurring) (noting that defining the automobile search incident to arrest exception 
requires an interpretation of article I, section 7); Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 690, 720 P.2d at 1242–43 
(recounting the history of the search of a vehicle incident to arrest in Washington through the lens of 
article I, section 7). 
108. See JOURNAL, supra note 98, at 497. 
109. WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7. 
110. See Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 690, 720 P.2d at 1243 (citing JOURNAL, supra note 98, at 51, 
497). 
111. See, e.g., State v. Moore, 161 Wash. 2d 880, 885, 169 P.3d 469, 471 (2007) (“‘[T]he search 
incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement is narrower’ under article I, section 7 than 
under the Fourth Amendment.” (quoting State v. O’Neil, 148 Wash. 2d 564, 584, 62 P.3d 489, 501 
(2003))); Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 148, 720 P.2d 436, 439 (“[Article I, section 7 of the] 
Washington State Constitution affords individuals greater protections against warrantless searches 
than does the Fourth Amendment.”); State v. Myrick, 102 Wash. 2d 506, 510, 688 P.2d 151, 153 
(1984) (“[T]he unique language of [article I, section 7] provides greater protection to persons under 
the Washington Constitution than [the Fourth Amendment] provides to persons generally.” (citing 
State v. Jackson, 102 Wash. 2d 432, 688 P.2d 136 (1984))); State v. Chrisman, 100 Wash. 2d 814, 
676 P.2d 419 (1984); see also JONATHAN BECHTLE & MICHAEL REITZ, TO PROTECT AND 
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The Washington State Supreme Court first expressed the common 
law search incident to arrest doctrine in State ex rel. Murphy v. Brown.112 
In that case, an officer seized evidence from the person of a suspect upon 
making a warrantless arrest.113 The Court discussed the officer’s 
authority to search and seize the papers without a warrant in dicta: 
The general rule is that, where a person is legally arrested, the 
arresting officer has a right to search such person, and take from 
his possession money or goods which the officer reasonably 
believes to be connected with the supposed crime, and 
discoveries made in this lawful search may be shown at the trial 
in evidence.114 
In discussing this authority, the Brown Court cited the principle 
expressed in Weeks v. United States,115 that “such [a] right has always 
been recognized under English and American law, and has been 
uniformly maintained in many cases.”116 Thus, the early interpretation of 
search incident to arrest under article I, section 7 appeared to derive 
directly from English and American common law. 
B. The Search of a Vehicle Incident to Arrest Exception Fluctuated 
Between 1923 and 1962 
The preconditions under Washington’s search incident to arrest 
exception fluctuated between 1923 and 1962.117 In the beginning of this 
                                                     
MAINTAIN INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: A CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION, ARTICLE 
I, at 23 (2008) (noting that cases interpreting article I, section 7 of the Washington State 
Constitution grant individuals greater protections than the Fourth Amendment); ROBERT F. UTTER 
& HUGH D. SPITZER, THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 20–22 (2002) 
(noting instances in which the Washington State Supreme Court has declared article I, section 7 to 
offer greater protections than those available under the Fourth Amendment). 
112. 83 Wash. 100, 145 P. 69 (1914); see also Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 693, 720 P.2d at 1244 
(“The earliest expression of the common law ‘search incident to arrest’ doctrine in Washington is 
found in [Brown].”). 
113. Brown, 83 Wash. at 101–02, 145 P. at 69–70. 
114. Id. at 105–06, 145 P. at 71. 
115. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). 
116. Brown, 83 Wash. at 106, 145 P. at 71 (quoting Weeks, 232 U. S. at 392). 
117. The cases discussed in this section—State v. Hughlett, 124 Wash. 366, 370, 214 P. 841, 843 
(1923), allowing a search incident to arrest for offense-relevant evidence at the time of arrest and in 
the area under an arrestee’s control; State v. Deitz, 136 Wash. 228, 230–31, 239 P. 386, 387 (1925), 
holding a search of a vehicle incident to arrest need not be for evidence relevant to the crime of 
arrest; State v. Miller, 151 Wash. 114, 115, 275 P. 75, 75 (1929), predicating the valid search of a 
vehicle incident to arrest solely upon the occurrence of a lawful arrest; State v. McCollum, 17 Wash. 
2d 85, 89 136 P.2d 165, 167 (1943), upholding the search of a home incident to the arrest of a non-
present arrestee; State v. Cyr, 40 Wash. 2d 840, 844–45, 246 P.2d 480, 484 (1952), allowing the 
search of a vehicle incident to arrest when it was parked reasonably close to the scene of the arrest, 
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period, the Washington State Supreme Court required both that the 
arrestee be physically proximate to the scene of the search and that the 
evidence sought be relevant to the crime of arrest.118 In the following 
years, the Court alternatively employed standards that lacked any such 
relevant evidence requirement119 and that increasingly relaxed the 
physical proximity requirement, eventually rendering it effectively 
nominal.120 
Washington’s first application of the search incident to arrest 
exception to the automobile context121 came in 1923 with State v. 
Hughlett.122 There, the Court required both physical proximity of the 
arrestee to the location of the search and limited the scope of the search 
to evidence relevant to the crime of arrest.123 The Court upheld the 
search of the suspect’s car and suitcase contained therein and the seizure 
of bootleg whiskey found in both.124 The justices reasoned: 
It has always been held that a peace officer, when he makes a 
lawful arrest, may lawfully, without a search warrant, search the 
person arrested and take from him any evidence tending to prove 
the crime with which he is charged. From this it seems to us to 
follow logically that a similar search, under the same 
circumstances, may be made of the automobile of which he has 
possession and control at the time of his arrest. This is true 
because the person arrested has the immediate physical 
possession, not only of the grips or suit cases which he is 
carrying, but also of the automobile which he is driving and of 
which he has control.125 
Just two years after Hughlett, the Court abandoned the requirement 
that the evidence sought be relevant to the crime of arrest. In State v. 
                                                     
and the officers were looking for evidence relevant to crime of the arrest; and State v. Jackovick, 56 
Wash. 2d 915, 917, 355 P.2d 976, 977 (1960), allowing officers to search incident to arrest the area 
where the arrest is made—were overruled “to a greater or lesser degree” in 1983 by State v. Ringer, 
100 Wash. 2d 686, 699, 720 P.2d 1240, 1247 (1983). 
118. See, e.g., Hughlett, 124 Wash. at 370, 214 P. at 843–44. 
119. See, e.g., Deitz, 136 Wash. at 231, 239 P. at 387. 
120. See, e.g., Cyr, 40 Wash. 2d at 844, 246 P.2d at 483–84. 
121. In one earlier case, the Washington State Supreme Court refused to apply the search incident 
to arrest exception to the warrantless search and seizure of contraband from the arrestee’s 
automobile because the arrest itself was invalid. State v. Gibbons, 118 Wash. 171, 182–83, 203 P. 
390, 394 (1922). The Court did not discuss whether the search incident to arrest exception would 
have applied, and by what criteria, had the arrest been lawful. Id. 
122. 124 Wash. 366, 214 P. 841 (1923). 
123. Id. at 370, 214 P. at 843–44. 
124. Id. at 371, 214 P. at 844. 
125. Id. at 370, 214 P. at 843–44. 
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Deitz,126 officers searched a car and seized evidence from it after 
observing Deitz driving without proper license plates and with defective 
lights.127 The Court upheld the search as incident to arrest, holding that 
even though Deitz was arrested for a traffic violation whereas the search 
was for contraband, the lack of relevance of the evidence seized to the 
crime of arrest did not warrant suppression.128 
Between 1929 and 1962, the Washington State Supreme Court 
decided several cases that relaxed, if not effectively abandoned, the 
requirement of an arrestee’s physical presence at the location of a search 
incident to arrest.129 In State v. Miller,130 the Court upheld the search of 
the arrestee’s car for contraband solely on the basis that the officers had 
made a valid warrantless arrest, and gave no weight to the arrestee’s 
presence at the time of the search.131 Later, in State v. McCollum,132 a 
case that did not involve a vehicle, the Court upheld a search incident to 
arrest of the arrestee’s home conducted when the arrestee was 
hospitalized.133 In State v. Cyr,134 the Court upheld the search of a 
vehicle as valid incident to arrest, even though the arrestee was not 
present at the time of the search, because the automobile itself was 
“parked reasonably close” to the place of arrest, and the officer had 
“good reason” to believe that evidence pertinent to the charge would be 
                                                     
126. 136 Wash. 228, 239 P. 386 (1925). 
127. Id. at 228–29, 239 P. at 386–87. Notably, the officers seized evidence from the trunk of the 
arrestee’s car, not the passenger compartment. Id. at 229, 239 P. at 387. However, it appears that, 
rather than abandoning the requirement that the arrestee be physically proximate to the search, the 
Court considered the trunk to be an area within the arrestee’s control. See id. at 231, 239 P. at 387 
(noting police may search an arrestee’s person or the area within his control incident to arrest (citing 
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925))). 
128. Deitz, 136 Wash. at 231, 239 P. at 387. 
129. See State v. Miller, 151 Wash. 114, 115, 275 P. 75, 75 (1929) (predicating the valid search 
of a vehicle incident to arrest solely upon the occurrence of a lawful arrest); State v. McCollum, 17 
Wash. 2d 85, 89, 136 P.2d 165, 167 (1943) (upholding the search of a home incident to the arrest of 
a non-present arrestee); State v. Cyr, 40 Wash. 2d 840, 844–45, 246 P.2d 480, 484 (1952) (allowing 
the search of a vehicle incident to arrest when it was parked reasonably close to the scene of the 
arrest and the officers were looking for evidence relevant to crime of the arrest); State v. Jackovick, 
56 Wash. 2d 915, 917, 355 P.2d 976, 977 (1960) (allowing a search incident to arrest to encompass 
“the area where the arrest was made.”); see also State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 696, 674 P.2d 
1240, 1246 (1983) (“After [the Miller decision in 1929], this court even abandoned the presence of 
the arrestee at the place of the search as a necessary predicate to its validity.”). 
130. 151 Wash. 114, 275 P. 75 (1929). 
131. Id. at 117–18, 275 P. at 76. 
132. 17 Wash. 2d 85, 136 P.2d 165 (1943). 
133. Id. at 89–90, 136 P.2d at 167. 
134. 40 Wash. 2d 840, 246 P.2d 480 (1952). 
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found in the vehicle.135 Finally, the Court once again upheld the search 
of a vehicle incident to the arrest of a non-present arrestee in State v. 
Jackovick,136 on grounds that officers may permissibly search “the area 
where the arrest is made.”137 
This trend of relaxation ended in 1962, when, in State v. Michaels138 
the Court strengthened its rule regarding the requirement of an arrestee’s 
physical presence at the scene of the search (while maintaining its 
requirement that such searches is for evidence of the crime of arrest).139 
In Michaels, the Court examined the search of a car for contraband after 
the driver had been arrested for a simple traffic violation.140 The Court 
found the search unlawful,141 and stated the rule that “an officer may 
take into custody a person who commits a misdemeanor in his presence, 
and upon making the arrest, may search the person and his immediate 
environs for evidence of the crime or tools which would aid in the 
arrested person’s escape.”142 While the Court invalidated the search on 
the grounds that the evidence sought was not relevant to the offense of 
arrest,143 the Court’s strong language regarding physical proximity—that 
a search incident to arrest may only encompass the arrestee’s 
“immediate environs”144—expressed a standard far more stringent than 
in previous decisions.145 
                                                     
135. Id. at 844, 246 P.2d at 483. 
136. 56 Wash. 2d 915, 355 P.2d 976 (1960). 
137. Id. at 917, 355 P.2d at 977. 
138. 60 Wash. 2d 638, 374 P.2d 989 (1962). 
139. Id. at 642–43, 374 P.2d at 991; see also State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 696, 720 P.2d 
1240, 1246 (1983) (“Finally, in [Michaels], this court began to impose restrictions on the authority 
of police to make searches pursuant to arrest.” (citation omitted)). 
140. Michaels, 60 Wash. 2d at 639–40, 374 P.2d at 990. 
141. Id. at 645, 374 P.2d at 993 (“The evidence in this case conclusively shows that the arrest was 
made for the sole purpose of searching the automobile to ascertain whether it contained any 
contraband property. It was a mere pretext for the search and was therefore unlawful. Consequently, 
the defendant’s motions to suppress should have been granted.”). 
142. Id. at 642–43, 374 P.2d at 991. 
143. Id. at 645, 374 P.2d at 993. 
144. Id. at 643, 374 P.2d at 991. 
145. Id.; cf. State v. Jackovick, 56 Wash. 2d 915, 917, 355 P.2d 976, 977 (1960) (allowing a 
search incident to arrest to encompass “the area where the arrest was made”); State v. Cyr, 40 Wash. 
2d 840, 844, 246 P.2d 480, 483 (1952) (allowing the search incident to arrest of a vehicle that was 
parked “reasonably close” to the scene of the arrest). 
Brown DTPed.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2010 10:24 AM 
2010] WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION AFTER GANT 375 
 
C. Washington Turned to the Fourth Amendment for Almost Twenty 
Years before Announcing a Return to Article I, Section 7 in 1983 
In the years after Michaels, the Washington State Supreme Court 
turned away from article I, section 7 and looked to federal jurisprudence 
to determine the limits of searches of vehicles incident to arrest.146 In 
1983, however, in State v. Ringer,147 the Washington State Supreme 
Court conducted a sweeping review of the evolution of the search of a 
vehicle incident to arrest exception in Washington, and explicitly 
identified three stages of development therein, before announcing the 
beginning of a fourth stage.148 The Court found that the search incident 
to arrest exception had been allowed to expand beyond its initial 
purpose149 and professed to “return to the protections of [the 
Washington] constitution and to interpret them consistent with their 
common law beginnings.”150 The Court provided: 
                                                     
146. State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 697, 720 P.2d 1240, 1246 (1983) (“In the years 
immediately following Michaels, this court disregarded the plethora of cases interpreting [article I, 
section 7] and began instead to rely on federal cases interpreting [the Fourth Amendment].”). In 
Ringer, the Washington State Supreme Court identified several instances in which the court turned 
to the Fourth Amendment in order to interpret the search of a vehicle incident to arrest. In State v. 
Riggins, for example, the Court looked extensively to the United States Supreme Court’s decision in 
Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964), and found the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
Fourth Amendment controlling with respect to the search of a vehicle incident to arrest in 
Washington. See Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 697, 720 P.2d at 1246–47 (citing Riggins, 64 Wash. 2d 
881, 886, 395 P.2d 85, 89–90 (1964)). Similarly, in State v. Johnson, the Washington State Supreme 
Court “continued to rely on federal precedent,” but also “continued to require that a search incident 
to arrest be for evidence of the crime for which the defendant was arrested.” Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 
at 697–98, 720 P.2d at 1247 (citing Johnson, 71 Wash. 2d 239, 243, 427 P.2d 705, 707 (1967)). 
Finally, in State v. Simpson, the Court invalidated a search incident to arrest “because the [arrestee] 
was not in the truck when arrested and had already been removed from the area when the search of 
the truck took place,” but did so using federal precedent. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 698, 720 P.2d at 
1247 (quoting Simpson, 95 Wash. 2d 170, 191, 622 P.2d 1199, 1212 (1980)). 
147. 100 Wash. 2d 686, 674 P.2d 1240 (1983). 
148. Id. at 698–99, 720 P.2d at 1247 (“We perceive three stages in the prior development of the 
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement. The exception began as a narrow rule 
intended solely to protect against frustration of the arrest itself or destruction of evidence by the 
arrestee. This was the scope of the exception when [article I, section 7] was adopted. In the early 
20th century, however, both the federal courts and the courts of this state, with little or no reasoned 
analysis, expanded the exception until it threatened to swallow the general rule that a warrant is 
required. From 1964, when Preston v. United States was decided, until 1981, when it decided New 
York v. Belton, the United States Supreme Court interpreted the search incident to arrest exception 
in a manner consistent with its common law origins. In those years we neglected our own state 
constitution to focus instead on protections provided by [the Fourth Amendment]. . . . We choose 
now to return to the protections of our own constitution and to interpret them consistent with their 
common law beginnings.” (citations omitted)). 
149. Id. at 698, 720 P.2d at 1247. 
150. Id. at 699, 720 P.2d at 1247. 
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Based on our understanding of [article I, section 7], we conclude 
that, when a lawful arrest is made, the arresting officer may 
search the person arrested and the area within his immediate 
control. A warrantless search in this situation is permissible only 
to remove any weapons the arrestee might seek to use in order 
to resist arrest or effect an escape and to avoid destruction of 
evidence by the arrestee of the crime for which he or she is 
arrested.151 
The Court therefore announced that, in keeping with its declared 
return to article I, section 7, the search incident to arrest exception would 
be narrowed to the arrestee’s person and area within his immediate 
control, and authorized only for the purposes of protecting officer safety 
and the integrity of the arrest, or to preserve evidence of the crime of 
arrest.152 In doing so, the Court also overturned prior cases that had 
expanded the exception.153 
D. Washington Abandoned Ringer for a Bright-Line Rule in Stroud 
A mere three years after deciding Ringer, the Washington State 
Supreme Court overturned it in favor of a bright-line rule.154 In State v. 
Stroud, the Court departed dramatically from its narrow Ringer 
approach.155 In Stroud, two law enforcement officers arrested two 
defendants next to a parked car after observing them apparently 
attempting to rob a vending machine.156 The officer searched the car, 
                                                     
151. Id., 720 P.2d at 1248 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
152. Id., 720 P.2d at 1248; see also UTTER & SPITZER, supra note 111, at 4 (explaining that with 
Ringer, the Court announced an approach to analyzing searches incident to arrest by interpreting 
article I, section 7 “by reference to the common law of search and seizure as it existed when the 
Washington Constitution was adopted”). 
153. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 699, 720 P.2d at 1247 (“[W]e find it necessary to overrule several 
of our previous cases. To a greater or lesser degree, [Hughlett, Deitz, Miller, McCollum, Cyr, and 
Jackovick] are all without historic foundation and are inconsistent with traditional protections 
against the ability of law enforcement officers to make warrantless searches and seizures.”); see also 
supra Part II.B. 
154. State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 151–52, 720 P.2d 436, 440–41 (1986), overruled by State 
v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 777, 224 P.3d 751, 759 (2009). However, Ringer was discussed 
favorably by the Washington State Supreme Court in the years between 1983 and 1986. See, e.g., 
State v. Williams, 102 Wash. 2d 733, 742 n.6, 689 P.2d 1065, 1070 n.6 (1984) (“In Ringer, this 
court declined to follow federal precedents governing the Fourth Amendment and searches incident 
to arrest. Relying on [article I, section 7], we limited police officers’ right to search incident to an 
arrest to those circumstances when police are confronted by emergencies and exigencies which do 
not permit reasonable time and delay for a judicial officer to evaluate and act upon probable cause 
applications for warrants by police officers.”). 
155. 106 Wash. 2d at 151, 720 P.2d at 440. 
156. Id. at 145, 720 P.2d at 437. 
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finding a weapon and various drug paraphernalia.157 The car was then 
impounded, and police seized additional items during an inventory 
search.158 
After their conviction, the defendants appealed on the basis that the 
trial court should have suppressed items seized during the warrantless 
search of the vehicle.159 The court of appeals certified the question to the 
Washington State Supreme Court, which affirmed the conviction.160 In 
doing so, the Court sought explicitly to “define more precisely the scope 
of the automobile exception to the warrant requirement implied in 
Article 1, Section 7 of the Washington Constitution.”161 
The Court first noted that federal cases, such as Belton, had recently 
“enlarged the narrow exceptions to the prohibition in the Fourth 
Amendment against warrantless searches.”162 If decided under the 
Fourth Amendment, the Court reasoned, the search of the car in Stroud 
would easily be upheld as incident to the defendants’ lawful arrests.163 
However, the Court declined to decide the case on Fourth Amendment 
grounds because the “Washington State Constitution affords individuals 
greater protections against warrantless searches than does the Fourth 
Amendment.”164 
Although the Court applied “the more protective standards of Article 
I, Section 7,” it “nevertheless [held] the search of defendants’ car 
lawful.”165 In doing so, the Court was forced to overturn the part of 
Ringer requiring “actual exigent circumstances,”166 determined by “the 
totality of the circumstances”167 on a “case-by-case basis.”168 The Court 
justified its decision on the basis that “[t]he Ringer holding [made] it 
virtually impossible for officers to decide whether or not a warrantless 
search would be permissible,” and added that “[w]eighing the ‘totality of 
circumstances’ [was] too much of a burden to put on police officers who 
must make a decision to search with little more than a moment’s 
                                                     
157. Id. at 146, 720 P.2d at 437. 




162. Id. at 147, 720 P.2d at 438. 
163. Id. at 148, 720 P.2d at 439. 
164. Id., 720 P.2d at 439. 
165. Id. at 150, 720 P.2d at 440. 
166. Id. at 152, 720 P.2d at 441. 
167. Id. at 150, 720 P.2d at 440. 
168. Id. at 151, 720 P.2d at 440. 
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reflection.”169 The Court buttressed this argument by pointing to the 
reasoning of the United States Supreme Court in Belton but declined to 
reach Belton’s conclusion, stressing the heightened privacy requirements 
of article I, section 7.170 The Court instead concluded: 
During the arrest process, including the time immediately 
subsequent to the suspect’s being arrested, handcuffed, and 
placed in a patrol car, officers should be allowed to search the 
passenger compartment of a vehicle for weapons or destructible 
evidence. However, if the officers encounter a locked container 
or locked glove compartment, they may not unlock and search 
either container without obtaining a warrant.171 
The Stroud bright-line rule resembled the Belton rule, but with the 
added limitation that police could not open locked containers or a locked 
glove compartment without first obtaining a warrant, an imposition 
necessary to satisfy the heightened privacy requirements of article I, 
section 7.172 This resemblance to Belton notwithstanding, the Stroud 
Court carefully stated that “[w]e wish to make clear that 
our . . . determination in this case is not based on prior federal case law, 
and that we decide this case solely on independent state grounds.”173 
Stroud thus established a rule especially conscious of the pragmatic 
concerns of law enforcement under article I, section 7 that would remain 
intact until the United States Supreme Court announced Gant in 2009. 
                                                     
169. Id. The type of concerns expressed here by the Stroud Court continue to be articulated by 
law enforcement officers. Since Gant, for example, officers of the Seattle Police Department have 
reported that the concept of an arrestee being “unsecured” and “within reaching distance” of the 
passenger compartment is too vague to be workable in the field. Telephone Interview with Scott 
Bachler, Lieutenant, Seattle Police Dep’t (Feb. 17, 2010). Under what exact conditions is an arrestee 
considered “unsecured”? What exact area is considered “within reaching distance” of the passenger 
compartment? These sort of ad hoc determinations, required by the first prong of Gant, implicate 
the Stroud Court’s criticism of a rule requiring officers to make a snap determination of whether a 
search would be permissible, with little in the way of guidance. In contrast, the relevant evidence 
rule at least provides officers with some form of functional guidance. Id. The determination that 
evidence relevant to the crime of arrest may be found in the passenger compartment is one that 
officers can safely and effectively make in the field. Id. 
170. 106 Wash. 2d at 151–52, 720 P.2d at 440; see also supra Part I.A (discussing Belton). 
171. Id. at 152, 720 P.2d at 441. 
172. Id. 
173. Id. at 149, 720 P.2d at 439. 
Brown DTPed.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2010 10:24 AM 
2010] WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION AFTER GANT 379 
 
III. THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT HAS 
REVISITED THE SEARCH OF A VEHICLE INCIDENT TO 
ARREST EXCEPTION POST-GANT 
In its first major post-Gant decisions,174 the Washington State 
Supreme Court examined the search of a vehicle incident to arrest in 
State v. Patton175 and State v. Valdez.176 Patton required that either a 
concern for officer safety or the preservation of relevant evidence exist 
at the time of the search for a search incident to arrest to be valid.177 Two 
months later, the Valdez Court—without mentioning Patton—affirmed a 
near-identical standard.178 Patton and Valdez brought Washington law in 
line with the clarified Chimel-Belton rule contained in Gant’s first 
prong. However, neither case explicitly adopted or excluded Gant’s 
second prong—the relevant evidence rule—under article I, section 7. 
A. Patton Required that Concerns for Either Officer Safety or the 
Preservation of Crime-Relevant Evidence Exist at the Time of the 
Search 
In Patton, deputies observed a suspect with an outstanding felony 
arrest warrant rummaging around in his vehicle and arrested him after he 
fled the vehicle for a nearby trailer.179 The deputies secured him in a 
patrol car and searched his vehicle, where they located 
methamphetamine.180 The trial court “conclud[ed] that the search was 
not incident to arrest because Patton was not arrested until he was taken 
into physical custody in the trailer,” and the court of appeals agreed.181 
The Washington State Supreme Court granted review in order to 
determine “whether the search incident to arrest exception [to article I, 
section 7] applie[d] in these circumstances.”182 
                                                     
174. Patton and Valdez are the only such decisions at the time of publication. The Washington 
State Supreme Court did, however, hold oral argument in State v. Adams regarding warrantless 
vehicle searches incident to arrest in early 2010. Video Recording of Oral Arguments, State v. 
Adams, No. 82210-7 (Wash. argued Feb. 23, 2010), http://www.tvw.org/media/mediaplayer.cfm? 
evid=2010020008A&TYPE=V&CFID=6066626&CFTOKEN=68122957&bhcp=1. 
175. 167 Wash. 2d 379, 219 P.3d 651 (2009). 
176. 167 Wash. 2d 761, 224 P.3d 751 (2009). 
177. 167 Wash. 2d at 394–95, 291 P.3d at 658. 
178. 167 Wash. 2d at 777, 224 P.3d at 759. 
179. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d at 384, 219 P.3d at 653. 
180. Id. at 385, 219 P.3d at 653. 
181. Id., 219 P.3d at 653 (emphasis added). 
182. Id. 
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The Court determined that it did not.183 Citing Ringer, Stroud, and 
subsequent cases interpreting Stroud,184 the Court determined that the 
bright-line rule contained in Stroud referred only to the scope of a search 
incident to arrest; it did not define the preconditions that would 
authorize such a search.185 With respect to those preconditions, the Court 
provided: 
[T]he search of a vehicle incident to the arrest of a recent 
occupant is unlawful absent a reasonable basis to believe that the 
arrestee poses a safety risk or that the vehicle contains evidence 
of the crime of arrest that could be concealed or destroyed, and 
that these concerns exist at the time of the search.186 
The Court did not, however, explain the extent to which its decision was 
influenced by Gant.187 Indeed, Gant was decided after the Patton Court 
had already concluded oral argument.188 Without requesting any 
additional briefing on Gant, and without holding any additional oral 
argument,189 the Washington State Supreme Court in Patton simply 
asserted via footnote that its decision was “consistent with . . . Gant.”190 
                                                     
183. Id. at 395, 219 P.3d at 658 (“Under a proper understanding of the search incident to arrest 
exception, the circumstances here simply do not involve a search incident to arrest.”). 
184. Id. at 392–94, 219 P.3d at 656–57. 
185. Id. at 393, 219 P.3d at 657 (identifying Stroud and its progeny as creating a “bright line rule 
as to the scope of the area that may be searched”). 
186. Id. at 394–95, 219 P.3d at 658. 
187. The Patton Court referred to Gant as “a necessary course correction” for the broad 
application of Chimel that proliferated in the wake of Belton, id. at 394, 219 P.3d at 658, but 
maintained that its holding represented an interpretation of article I, section 7, id. at 385 n.3, 219 
P.3d at 653 n.3. Concurring, Justice James Johnson found the majority’s claim unconvincing and 
unnecessary: “[Gant] has decided this case for us, while this court was agonizing for a year over the 
analysis. . . . Since the relevant facts are identical, the [Gant] holding must be applied . . . . The 
majority engages in extensive dicta [regarding article I, section 7] unnecessary to the decision to 
suppress the evidence . . . .” Id. at 396–97, 219 P.3d at 659 (Johnson, J., concurring). 
188. The record indicates that oral argument for Patton concluded on May 29, 2008. See 
Washington Courts, Appellate Court Case Summary for Case Number 805181, 
http://dw.courts.wa.gov/index.cfm?fa=home.casesummary&casenumber=805181%20%20%20& 
searchtype=aName&crt_itl_nu=A08&filingDate=2007-08-21 [hereinafter Appellate Court Case 
Summary] (last visited Mar. 17, 2010). This was nearly a year before Gant was decided on April 21, 
2009. 
189. The record contains no indication of additional briefing or oral argument on the Gant issue. 
Appellate Court Case Summary, supra note 188. 
190. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d at 396 n.9, 219 P.3d at 658 n.9. 
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B. Valdez Independently Required that Concerns for Officer Safety or 
the Perseveration of Crime-Relevant Evidence Exist at the Time of 
the Search 
The Washington State Supreme Court again addressed the post-Gant 
future of the search of a vehicle incident to arrest exception in Valdez, 
but this time the Court did analyze the exception in the context of 
Gant.191 The Court addressed the question of “whether an automobile 
search incident to arrest, where the arrestee was handcuffed and secured 
prior to the search of the automobile, was constitutional under article I, 
section 7 of the Washington State Constitution and/or the Fourth 
Amendment to the United States Constitution.”192 In Valdez, an officer 
pulled over a suspect for a traffic violation and discovered an 
outstanding warrant for his arrest.193 The officer arrested and secured the 
suspect in a patrol car, searched the suspect’s vehicle and noticed loose 
panels.194 He called in a canine unit, which discovered 
methamphetamine.195 
Applying Gant, the Washington State Supreme Court ruled that the 
search violated the Fourth Amendment because the arrestee was secured 
at the time of the search, and the State had not shown that it was 
reasonable to believe evidence relevant to the crime of the arrest might 
be found in the vehicle.196 Without citing any authority, but applying a 
rule similar to the one announced in Patton,197 the Court held that the 
search violated article I, section 7 because it “was not necessary to 
remove any weapons the arrestee could use to resist arrest or effect an 
escape, or to secure any evidence of the crime of the arrest that could be 
concealed or destroyed.”198 The Court thus rejected the search under 
both the Fourth Amendment Gant rules and article I, section 7. The 
Court did not, however, discuss whether the second Gant rule—the 
relevant evidence rule—applied under article I, section 7. 
                                                     
191. 167 Wash. 2d 761, 768, 224 P.3d 751, 754 (2009) (“Due to a recent opinion of the United 
States Supreme Court [in Gant], we are required to consider the previous decisions of the United 
States Supreme Court and this court in light of that decision.” (citations omitted)). 
192. Id. at 765, 224 P.3d at 753 (emphasis added). 
193. Id. at 766, 224 P.3d at 753. 
194. Id. 
195. Id. 
196. Id. at 778, 224 P.3d at 759. 
197. Interestingly, the majority in Valdez did not cite Patton once in its entire opinion. 
198. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 778, 224 P.3d at 760. 
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C. Patton and Valdez Adopt a Standard Similar to Gant’s Clarified 
Chimel-Belton Rule, but Neither Accepts nor Rejects the Relevant 
Evidence Rule 
Because Patton and Valdez both premise the search of a vehicle 
incident to arrest upon concerns for officer safety or the preservation of 
evidence,199 both cases adopt a standard similar to Gant’s clarified 
Chimel-Belton rule. Patton requires that an officer possess “a reasonable 
basis to believe that the arrestee poses a safety risk or that the vehicle 
contains evidence of the crime of arrest that could be concealed or 
destroyed,” and that “these concerns exist at the time of the search.”200 
The Chimel-Belton rule is based on the same two justifications: 
protecting officer safety and preserving evidence.201 As clarified by 
Gant, this rule further requires that the concerns exist “at the time of the 
search.”202 The Patton holding mirrors this reasoning precisely.203 
Valdez, which considered Gant more extensively than did Patton, also 
expresses a rule that requires concerns for officer safety or the 
preservation of evidence,204 and further demonstrates that Washington 
has adopted a rule similar to the Chimel-Belton rule. While the majority 
in Valdez makes no reference to Patton, Valdez nevertheless presents a 
nearly identical version of the first Gant prong.205 
The Court’s analysis in Valdez begins with noting that Gant binds the 
Court to consider Fourth Amendment jurisprudence in redefining the 
permissible preconditions for the search of a vehicle incident to arrest 
under article I, section 7.206 After tracing the development of the Chimel-
Belton rule and discussing the history of its Washington analog,207 the 
Court concluded: 
 
                                                     
199. State v. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d 379, 394–95, 219 P.3d 651, 658 (2009); Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 
at 778, 224 P.3d at 759. 
200. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d at 395, 219 P.3d at 658. 
201. See supra Part I.A. 
202. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009). 
203. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d at 395, 219 P.3d at 658. 
204. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 777, 224 P.3d at 759. 
205. Note that whereas Valdez discussed both Gant prongs under the Fourth Amendment, the 
Court did not state whether the second Gant prong exception (the relevant evidence rule) applied 
under article I, section 7. See id. at 768–71, 224 P.3d at 754–56. 
206. Id. at 768, 224 P.3d at 754. 
207. Id. at 768–71, 224 P.3d at 754–56 (Fourth Amendment analysis); id. at 771–77, 224 P.3d at 
756–59 (article I, section 7 analysis). 
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[A]fter an arrestee is secured and removed from the automobile, 
he or she poses no risk of obtaining a weapon or concealing or 
destroying evidence of the crime of arrest located in the 
automobile, and thus the arrestee’s presence does not justify a 
warrantless search under the search incident to arrest 
exception.208 
As in Patton, this reasoning closely resembles Gant’s clarified 
Chimel-Belton rule: if the arrestee has been secured away from the 
vehicle, the concerns of the Chimel-Belton rule are not implicated and do 
not authorize a search of the vehicle incident to arrest. 
While both Patton and Valdez consider Gant—to different degrees—
neither case explicitly accepts or rejects the relevant evidence rule.209 
The Patton Court merely stated via footnote that its decision was 
consistent with Gant, but did not indicate whether the relevant evidence 
rule was permissible under article I, section 7.210 The Valdez Court 
treated Gant more extensively than Patton, but, like Patton, did not 
announce the relevant evidence rule’s permissibility.211 The Court noted 
that it requested additional briefing on Gant,212 and discussed the 
application of the relevant evidence rule213 under the Fourth 
Amendment,214 but did not declare whether that rule applied under 
article I, section 7. 
IV. THE WASHINGTON STATE SUPREME COURT SHOULD 
ADOPT A MODIFIED RELEVANT EVIDENCE RULE 
If and when the Washington State Supreme Court considers a case 
that squarely implicates the relevant evidence rule, it should adopt a 
relevant evidence rule modified in scope to reflect the heightened 
privacy requirement of article I, section 7. Such an approach would best 
satisfy Gant and preserve the purpose of that provision because 
                                                     
208. Id. at 775–76, 224 P.3d at 759 (overruling State v. Stroud to the extent it is inconsistent with 
the Valdez opinion). 
209. One possible explanation for this omission is that neither Valdez nor Patton presented the 
Court with facts squarely implicating the relevant evidence rule. In both cases, the Court considered 
arrests due to outstanding warrants, stemming from offenses that did not present a reasonable basis 
to believe that relevant evidence might be found in the vehicles. See State v. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d 
379, 395, 219 P.3d 651, 658 (2009); Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 778, 224 P.3d at 759. 
210. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d at 396 n.9, 219 P.3d at 658 n.9. 
211. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 768–71, 778, 224 P.3d at 754–56, 759–60. 
212. Id. at 768 n.2, 224 P.3d at 754 n.2. 
213. The Court did not use this term in referring to the rule in Valdez. 
214. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 771, 778, 224 P.3d at 756, 759. 
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Washington historical case law supports a search based on the 
preconditions for the relevant evidence rule, and the Washington State 
Supreme Court has already defined the permissible scope of the search 
of a vehicle incident to arrest. 
A. Patton and Valdez Support the Adoption of a Rule That Embraces 
the Relevant Evidence Rule’s Preconditions 
The Washington State Supreme Court in both Patton and Valdez did 
not explicitly reject or adopt Gant’s relevant evidence rule, but the Court 
did give analytic weight to the relevancy of evidence sought during the 
search, suggesting that such relevance does figure into an analysis of 
vehicle searches incident to arrest under article I, section 7 of the state 
constitution. Additionally, Valdez suggests that something other than an 
arrestee’s presence at the scene of the search may act as a justification 
for the search—further supporting the notion that relevancy matters. 
1.  Both Patton and Valdez give Analytic Weight to the Relevance of 
the Evidence Sought 
It is significant that, since Gant, the Court has reintroduced a relevant 
evidence requirement via Patton and Valdez. In finding the search in 
Patton invalid under article I, section 7, the Court noted that “[n]o 
connection existed between [the arrestee], the reason for his arrest 
warrant, and the [search of the] vehicle.”215 Because the arrestee’s 
outstanding warrant was for an unrelated past offense, “there was no 
basis to believe evidence relating to [his] arrest would have been found 
in the car.”216 This language bears a strong resemblance to the relevant 
evidence rule, which allows an officer to search a vehicle incident to 
arrest “when it is ‘reasonable to believe that evidence relevant to the 
crime of arrest will be found in the vehicle.’”217 
Valdez also gives analytic weight to the relevance of the evidence 
sought to the crime of arrest.218 Specifically, the Court pronounced that a 
search incident to arrest is invalid when there is no showing of concern 
for officer safety, or that “evidence related to the crime of arrest [may 
be] concealed or destroyed.”219 In other words, if a search incident to 
                                                     
215. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d at 395, 219 P.3d at 658. 
216. Id. at 395, 219 P.3d at 658. 
217. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct 1710, 1719 (2009) (quoting Thornton v. United 
States, 541 U.S. 615, 629 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring)). 
218. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 779, 224 P.3d at 760. 
219. Id. (emphasis added). 
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arrest under Valdez is to be justified on the basis of preventing the 
concealment or destruction of evidence, that evidence must be relevant 
to the crime of arrest. 
Admittedly, the inclusion of a relevant evidence requirement in both 
Patton and Valdez does not conclusively demonstrate, on its own, the 
permissibility of a rule that would allow vehicle searches incident to 
arrest for relevant evidence in the absence of Chimel-Belton-like 
concerns.220 It is possible that the Washington State Supreme Court has 
simply crafted a hybrid rule from Gant, one that preserves the exigencies 
of the Chimel-Belton standard, combined with the relevancy requirement 
of the relevant evidence rule.221 However, given that neither Patton nor 
Valdez explicitly discussed the issue one way or the other, the exact 
implications of Patton’s and Valdez’s relevancy requirement are not 
immediately clear. Consequently, the permissibility of the relevant 
evidence rule under article I, section 7 remains an open question. 
2.  Valdez Suggests Something Other Than an Arrestee’s Mere 
Presence at the Scene of a Search Might Justify a Search Incident 
to Arrest 
Valdez suggests that something other than an arrestee’s mere 
presence—and the entailed concerns for officer safety or the destruction 
or concealment of evidence—might justify a search.222 Valdez states that 
once an arrestee has been secured, and in accordance with the Chimel-
Belton rule contained in Gant, the arrestee’s presence no longer justifies 
the search of a vehicle incident to arrest.223 However, Valdez also 
provides that even where the circumstances of the search do not 
implicate the concerns of officer safety or the preservation of evidence, a 
warrantless search may still be tolerated if it “fall[s] under another 
                                                     
220. See Gant, 129 S. Ct. at 1719 (citing Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Thornton and noting that 
the rule contained therein does not follow from Chimel). 
221. It is further possible that the Washington State Supreme Court drew upon prior Washington 
decisions, rather than Gant, in reintroducing a relevant evidence requirement, although the timing of 
Patton and Valdez suggests otherwise. Such a requirement is found in Washington cases from the 
1960s. See, e.g., State v. Johnson, 71 Wash. 2d 239, 242–43, 427 P.2d 705, 707 (1967) (requiring 
that a search incident to arrest be for evidence of the crime of arrest); State v. Michaels, 60 Wash. 
2d 638, 644, 374 P.2d 989, 992 (1962) (same). These cases provide a potential alternative basis for 
the Court’s reasoning, although they were overruled “to a greater or lesser degree” by State v. 
Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 699, 720 P.2d 1240, 1247 (1983), overruled by State v. Stroud, 106 
Wash. 2d 144, 151, 720 P.2d 436, 439 (1986), overruled by State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 777, 
224 P.3d 751, 759 (2009). 
222. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 777, 224 P.3d at 759. 
223. Id. 
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applicable exception.”224 Whether the Court, by this statement, intended 
to allude to the possibility of an alternative justification for the search of 
a vehicle incident to arrest—or another type of warrantless search 
altogether—is unclear.225 However, the statement leaves room for the 
argument that the relevance of the evidence sought, in accordance with 
the rationale of the relevant evidence rule, might serve as such an 
alternative justification. 
B. A Modified Relevant Evidence Rule Is Consistent with Article I, 
Section 7 of the Washington State Constitution 
The Washington State Supreme Court should adopt a version of the 
relevant evidence rule modified to include a proscription on the opening 
of locked containers. Such an approach would be consistent with article 
I, section 7 because Washington common law possesses a history of 
such searches, analogous to the alternative line of common law relied 
upon by Gant and Thornton, and because the Washington State Supreme 
Court has already defined the heightened privacy protections required by 
article I, section 7 with respect to vehicle searches. 
1. Washington Historically Allowed the Search of a Vehicle Incident 
to Arrest for Relevant Evidence Irrespective of the Arrestee’s 
Location 
Like the alternative line of Fourth Amendment cases relied upon by 
Justice Scalia in Thornton and the United States Supreme Court in Gant, 
Washington possesses a line of cases under article I, section 7 that 
supports the permissibility of the relevant evidence rule.226 Historically, 
searches incident to arrest conducted after an arrestee has been secured 
and removed from the site of a search have been allowed under article I, 
                                                     
224. Id. 
225. The Washington State Supreme Court has also recognized the warrantless search of a 
vehicle when, for example, the officers are presented with certain exigent circumstances. These 
circumstances may include hot pursuit, a fleeing suspect, danger to an arresting officer or the public, 
mobility of a vehicle, and mobility or destruction of evidence. State v. Counts, 99 Wash. 2d 54, 60, 
659 P.2d 1087, 1089–90 (1983). Although they share some commonalities, “the search incident to 
arrest exception should be distinguished from the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant 
requirement.” State v. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d 379, 386 n.5, 219 P.3d 651, 654 n.5 (2009). The 
Washington State Court of Appeals also recently upheld the search of a vehicle incident to arrest 
based upon presumptively valid interpretations of constitutional law later declared unconstitutional 
by Gant. State v. Riley, No. 62418-1, 2010 WL 427118, at *1 (Wash. Ct. App. Feb. 8, 2010). 
226. See supra note 129–37 and accompanying text. 
Brown DTPed.doc (Do Not Delete) 5/17/2010 10:24 AM 
2010] WASHINGTON CONSTITUTION AFTER GANT 387 
 
section 7.227 Cases decided between 1929 and 1962 allowed searches 
incident to the arrest of a non-present arrestee—either because the Court 
paid no heed to the arrestee’s presence, or because it relaxed the physical 
proximity requirement so far as to render it effectively nominal.228 
More recently, the Washington State Supreme Court has spoken 
emphatically against such searches,229 but never in a way that 
undermines the justifications for the relevant evidence rule. In Patton, 
for example, the Court noted that while it had previously “upheld 
searches incident to arrest conducted after the arrestee has been 
secured,”230 it would now “expressly disapprove of this expansive 
application of the narrow search incident to arrest exception.”231 But in 
doing so, the Court relied on the Chimel-Belton-like reasoning contained 
in Ringer, requiring concerns for officer safety or the destruction of 
evidence.232 Valdez similarly relied heavily on Ringer, from a Chimel-
Belton-like standpoint.233 Neither of these cases directly addressed the 
alternative reasoning that justifies the relevant evidence rule, a rule that 
depends simply on the relevance of the evidence sought and does not 
implicate the officer safety or destruction of evidence concerns that 
underlie the Chimel-Belton rule.234 The Washington State Supreme 
Court’s disapproval of these cases in the Ringer/Chimel-Belton context 
does not therefore necessitate a disapproval of the searches they contain 
in the relevant evidence rule context. 
                                                     
227. See supra note 129–37 and accompanying text; see also State v. Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d 686, 
696, 720 P.2d 1240, 1246 (1983) (noting that the Washington State Supreme Court previously 
allowed searches incident to arrest after the suspect had been secured away from the place of arrest 
at the time of the search), overruled on other grounds by State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 720 
P.2d 436 (1986). 
228. See supra note 129–37 and accompanying text. 
229. See, e.g., State v. Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d 761, 774–77, 224 P.3d 751, 757–59 (2009); State v. 
Patton, 167 Wash. 2d 379, 395, 219 P.3d 651, 658 (2009); Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 699, 720 P.2d at 
1247. 
230. Patton, 167 Wash. 2d at 395, 219 P.3d at 658. 
231. Id. at 395, 219 P.3d at 658. 
232. Id. at 389, 219 P.3d at 655 (citing Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 699–700, 674 P.2d at 1248)). 
233. See Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 774, 224 P.3d at 758 (citing Ringer, 100 Wash. 2d at 699, 674 
P.2d at 1247–48, for the proposition that prior Washington cases departed from the principles upon 
which the search incident to arrest exception was based). 
234. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. __, 129 S. Ct. 1710, 1719 (2009) (providing that an officer 
may search a vehicle incident to arrest for evidence relevant to the crime of arrest, “[a]lthough it 
does not follow from Chimel”). 
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2. Modifications to the Scope of the Relevant Evidence Rule Would 
Satisfy Article I, Section 7’s Heightened Privacy Protections 
While the Washington State Supreme Court has long held that article 
I, section 7 protects greater privacy interests in vehicles than does the 
Fourth Amendment,235 these interests are not without definition, and the 
relevant evidence rule may be modified accordingly. In Stroud, the 
Washington State Supreme Court defined the additional protections 
required by article I, section 7 by adopting a standard nearly identical to 
the Fourth Amendment, with the added requirement that an officer not 
open a locked glove box or any locked containers found during the 
search of a vehicle incident to arrest without first obtaining a warrant.236 
While the bright-line rule contained in Stroud has since been 
disapproved as a precondition to a search incident to arrest,237 the 
Washington State Supreme Court has never declared the formula for 
offering greater protections than the Fourth Amendment, articulated in 
Stroud, to be defunct. In this sense, the Stroud Court’s formula for 
modifying a Fourth Amendment standard into something permissible 
under article I, section 7 should still be considered good law; thus, a 
modified version of the relevant evidence rule, including a proscription 
on the opening of any locked containers or a locked glove box, would be 
consistent with article I, section 7.238 
CONCLUSION 
Following a turbulent history of complex interplay between 
Washington and federal law, the search of a vehicle incident to arrest 
exception under article I, section 7 continues to occupy a state of 
                                                     
235. See State v. Bello, 142 Wash. App. 930, 936, 176 P.3d 554, 558 (2008) (“[A]rticle 1, section 
7 provides greater protection of the privacy interest in a vehicle and its contents than does the 
Fourth Amendment.”). 
236. State v. Stroud, 106 Wash. 2d 144, 152, 720 P.2d 436, 441 (1986); see also supra Part II.D. 
237. See Patton, 167 Wash. 2d at 394, 219 P.3d at 657 (“We cannot presume that every time a car 
is present at the scene of an arrest, a search of the car falls within the scope of Stroud’s bright line 
rule.” (emphasis added)); see also Valdez, 167 Wash. 2d at 777, 224 P.3d at 759 (overturning 
Stroud’s bright-line rule with respect to the scope of a vehicle search incident to arrest). 
238. The Washington State Supreme Court has also provided that, pursuant to the heightened 
privacy protections of article I, section 7, a valid search incident to arrest may not extend to the 
search of items belonging to a vehicle’s nonarrested passenger, unless the state has made a showing 
of “the existence of any articulable, objective suspicion that [the] nonarrested passenger was armed 
or dangerous or had secreted contraband obtained from the arrestee.” State v. Parker, 139 Wash. 2d 
486, 504, 987 P.2d 73, 84 (1999). Such a further limitation of scope may also be considered in 
adopting the relevant evidence rule under article I, section 7. 
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regrettable uncertainty. The United States Supreme Court in Arizona v. 
Gant reinterpreted the search of a vehicle incident to arrest under the 
Fourth Amendment and threw Washington law into disarray. The 
resultant confusion is attributable both to the unsteady history of 
Washington jurisprudence concerning the search of a vehicle incident to 
arrest and Washington’s long-held maxim that article I, section 7 
provides greater protections than the Fourth Amendment. 
While the Washington State Supreme Court adopted Gant’s 
articulation of the federal Chimel-Belton standard in Patton and Valdez, 
requiring concern for officer safety or the preservation of evidence in 
order to conduct the search of a vehicle incident to arrest, it remains to 
be seen whether Washington will adopt the second standard contained in 
Gant—the relevant evidence rule. Unrelated to Chimel-Belton, the 
relevant evidence rule authorizes the search of a vehicle incident to 
arrest when it is reasonable to believe that it contains evidence relevant 
to the crime of the arrest—irrespective of the location of the arrestee at 
the time of the search. Such a search finds support in alternative lines of 
both Fourth Amendment and article I, section 7 jurisprudence. 
The Washington State Supreme Court should adopt a modified 
relevant evidence rule containing an added proscription on the opening 
of locked containers, because the concerns that led the Gant Court to 
adopt the logic of Justice Scalia’s concurring opinion in Thornton apply 
equally in Washington; because Washington common law also possesses 
a history of searches for relevant evidence; and because the Washington 
State Supreme Court has already defined the heightened protections 
required by article I, section 7 in the search of a vehicle incident to arrest 
context. Thus, a modified relevant evidence rule would be wholly 
consistent with article I, section 7. 
 
